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This year marks the 50th anniversary of the publication of the 
complete Systematic Theology, a massive attempt to present in a 
rational fashion the core of Christian beliefs, myths, and rites in a 
manner that speaks to its time—a time of profound unbelief and 
anxiety. As theologian, Tillich feels no lack of warrant, for theology 
speaks only of things that are of ultimate concern to humans, things 
that unavoidably interest us because they are a matter of our very 
being or nonbeing (ST I, 14, 16). Our experience of being in modern 
times is one of anxiety, a perceived background of meaninglessness 
that drives us into collectivism or conformism, or individualism, or 
despair and deprives us of authentic forms of courage—or the ability to 
confront our finitude, the wormhole of nonbeing in the ontological 
apple. “Anxiety is finitude, experienced as one’s own finitude” (CB 35). 
What is Christian in Tillich’s theology is its tie to historical Christianity 
and to the normative expression of early Christians that in Jesus God 
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manifested the Logos or messiah. But that is not our concern here, 
except to remark on Tillich’s intellectual honesty: he is an exquisite 
practitioner of the history of ideas, at once able to encompass whole 
eras in generalizations that are apt and to epitomize individual thinkers 
with remarkable brevity. Our concern in this paper is to elucidate how 
Tillich makes religion a matter of ontology, and how, from the very 
first, he follows Schelling’s model of ontological questioning—which I 
will here call the double-helix, or the twisted structure of being and 
nonbeing such that reality is unable to be in any other way than 
dynamic.  
 
In the first section of this paper I shall briefly discuss Tillich 
early Schelling studies and then turn to Schelling’s own texts to show 
that Tillich interpretation is correct. The major part of the paper will be 
devoted to showing how Schelling’s concepts form the structural 
backbone of Systematic Theology as well as the more accessible 
Courage to Be lectures where Tillich argues that the only form of 
credible religious belief is an absolute one where Christianity criticizes 
its concrete symbols and embraces a God beyond theism (CB 188-89). 
While the language of the lectures is more daring, its content is no 
more disquieting to the professional theologian than the picture 
presented in the final volume of Systematic Theology of the ambiguous 
presence of the Spirit in a spiritual community that across history may 
or may not dwell in those ecclesial structures that call themselves 
Christ’s church. The ‘unambiguous life’ that is sheltered by spiritual 
community is fragmentary and anticipatory at best, but without 
specific religious teachings, symbols or acts (ST 3, 157-58). Tillich’s 
religion, like Schelling’s, is ontological, not ecclesial.  
I. 
Tillich’s knowledge of Schelling is deep and sympathetic from 
the very first. In his philosophical dissertation of 1910, The 
Construction of the History of Religion in Schelling’s Positive 
Philosophy, the young Tillich attempts a sweeping interpretation of 
Schelling’s long journey to the philosophical religion of the late 
writings, but gravitates toward the philosophy of freedom of the 1809 
Philosophical Investigations. The essence of human consciousness is 
God-positing, or intellectual intuition of the identity between finite and 
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absolute consciousness (CHR 122), but at the same time it is 
estranged from its God-positing substantiality. Tillich agrees with 
Schelling that essence of the religious picture is that “the formulation 
of a concept of religion must necessarily include a relationship between 
God and man that presupposes a definite division between them” 
(ibid., 124). The tension between identity and action in the human 
spirit that is the driving motive in Schelling’s early philosophical 
development becomes in the 1809 essay a historical process, a path of 
development in which the rest of intellectual intuition is sundered 
when the subject becomes agent. Finite consciousness posits itself as 
fallen from the identity of its original God positing, but not as the 
natural religion of Enlightenment times might picture it, in 
independence from a rational world-architect and serenely possessing 
as its own its limited faculties of reason, imagination, and will. That 
human consciousness is God-positing and at the same time self-
separated from the divine is the core of Tillich’s view of human reality 
(ibid., 125-27). There is a struggle at the core of the religious 
relationship, which in its most explicit form is the guilt-accepting 
acceptance of unacceptability, viewed in The Courage to Be as Martin 
Luther’s personal or existential experience of Christian grace. In that 
experience, God is comprehends as the ontological Yes that includes 
its No, and blessedness is experienced as both bliss and the nameless 
anxiety it conquers (CB 170-71, 180).  
 
Tillich’s 1912 theological dissertation, Mysticism and Guilt-
consciousness in Schelling’s Philosophical Development, identifies the 
core of all of Schelling’s thought in the tension between the identity of 
God and the finite and the ‘fall’ (self-separation) of the later—or the 
otherness of existence, signified by the failure of the ontological proof 
(MG 35). While one might want to calculate the period of Schelling’s 
philosophical development in terms of the influence of other 
philosophers, so that besides the philosophy of nature there are 
periods where Plato, Spinoza, Boehme, Baader, Hegel, and finally 
Aristotle provide inspiration, there is really only one thematic thread at 
work throughout: the identity principle and its relation to moral 
categories such as separation, fall, and freedom. Tillich prefers the 
clarity of the 1809 Philosophical Investigations to the detail of the 
positive philosophy (ibid. 22-25). The discussion of Schelling’s text 
that he offers is quite condensed and cryptic. The early Fichtean 
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works, the essays in Naturphilosophie and the aesthetics of genius that 
crown the System of Transcendental Idealism are all read as variants 
of identity theory: ethical mysticism, nature mysticism, aesthetic 
mysticism (ibid., 45-68). Philosophy and Religion marks a turn toward 
history, and with the teaching of the self-separation or fall of the ideas 
into finite existence the mysticism of intellectual intuition is put at risk. 
Tillich’s exegesis of the freedom essay is quite dense and free-form: 
contradiction and self-will are read as ‘sin’ and ‘guilt’, and the cosmic 
process of separation of good and evil read as triumph of ‘grace’ over 
‘death and wrath’ (ibid., 108-112). But in phrases such as “the identity 
of sin and grace” Tillich thinks in solidarity with Schelling that evil and 
the self-will that is its origin remains even in the cosmic resolution. 
Guilt has its ground in ontology, as Tillich major works assert, and is 
no more a psychological quirk than the background radiation of 
anxiety that its horizon and cradle.  
 
II.  
 
Tillich’s theology follows Schelling’s philosophy in its insistence 
that religious questions are ontological ones, that ontology is a 
dynamic domain—and not an overview of an assemblage of things 
manufactured or arbitrarily brought together. The logos of being 
follows from the question, first posed by Leibniz, Why is there is 
something and not nothing? In its first and highest instance, being is 
self-realizing, that it includes and comprehends the possibility of 
nonbeing: that it stands out from nonbeing.  
 
Tillich opens Systematic Theology with an essay on reason and 
revelation. In its asking of the first and ultimate questions, reason is 
driven beyond itself to ‘mystery’, the ground and abyss that precedes 
reason. It is of ultimate concern for us because it is about the ground 
of our being, and it is ‘ecstatic’ because it reaches beyond the subject-
object structure for that which is primal. And it involves, says Tillich, 
“ontological” or metaphysical shock in that it involves: Why not 
nothing? and with that the realization that I or anybody might not be 
here to ask the question (ST 1, 110-113). There is something 
disquieting about the answers such a question can receive, for they 
are irretrievably symbolic or metaphorical; if one says “the divine life 
is a dynamic unity of depth and form,” and goes on to explain that by 
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”depth” one means the abysmal character of God, the ineffability and 
inexhaustibility of being itself, by ‘form” one means word, logic or 
structure, and by “dynamic unity” a process of unforeseeable 
communication or unfolding, it is obvious that these are not logical or 
personal categories (ST 1, 156, cp. 115). Tillich takes both this 
ontological starting point and the terms for describing the three-
dimensional life of God from Schelling. 
  
First, let us look to the theme of Schelling’s concept of ontology. 
When Schelling publically inaugurated the Positive Philosophy in 
1841/42 with the Berlin Lectures on the Philosophy of Revelation, 
insisting that the difference between concept and existence (or 
possibility and actuality) was unbridgeable, that the finite being of the 
potencies followed from the unforeseeable existence of the absolute 
Prius, he deepened and refined two earlier veins of ontological 
exploration (PO 160-64). The first to be explored (in the writings of 
1795-1801) was the relatively simple concept of God or the absolute 
as self-existent. The second (explored in the writings of 1801-1815) 
was the concept of God or the absolute as free over against being, or 
having an actuality that somehow dialectically combined being and 
nonbeing, or envisioned existence as involving a power that asserted 
being over nonbeing. The first line of thought yields a pure essence, 
the concept of necessary existence whose ontological status is 
necessary but contingent—a necessary existent, if it exists. The actus 
purus of the second line of thought makes the divine being 
contingently necessary, relative to the possibility for other-being that it 
established (ibid., 165-171). In a third aspect, the positive philosophy 
stipulates that God is spirit or freedom over against primordial being 
and realized possibility, the evolution of that which ought to be (ibid., 
172-76). The complicated line of thought developed here 
fundamentally pits the concept of necessary existence against freedom 
to be or not to be.  
 
Schelling had always demonstrated a fondness for the 
ontological proof, though he was as skeptical as Kant about whether it 
‘worked’. In 1795, he argued that in the realm of proof, we are always 
dealing with conditions; the divine being, however, ought to be a 
matter of rational analysis. And when we ascribe being to the absolute, 
we ought not confuse being with contingent existence or actuality (SW 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Futures of Schelling: The Second Conference of the North American Schelling Society, (2013). Unpublished paper. This 
article is © Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy and permission has been granted for this version to 
appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy does not grant permission 
for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Society for 
Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. 
6 
 
I, 308, 308n). In 1802, Schelling uses the analog of the ontological 
proof to explain the certainty of intellectual intuition; from the very 
idea of an absolute cognition that one has, one can infer the reality of 
an absolute wherein form and being are the same. What is deficient in 
the so-called proof is its picturing its object as somehow subsisting 
outside of its cognizing and being-cognized (SW 4, 363-68). In 1804 
Schelling repeats and amplifies this argument, moving from the self-
intuition of reason in intellectual intuition to the conclusion that what is 
realized in reason is the idea of God. The idea of God is self-realizing in 
reason—the form of cognition that is self-identical and beyond the 
difference of discursive knowing (SW 6, 150-54). The idea of God, 
which is self-enjoyed in intellectual intuition, illuminates the ‘why’ of 
God’s being, i.e., it is modally necessary, not factual, and so forever 
beyond the reach of nonbeing. Nothing or utter nonbeing is impossible. 
Says Schelling:  
 
The absolute light: the idea of God, strikes reason like a flash of 
lightning, so to speak, and its luminosity endures in reason as 
an eternal affirmation of knowledge. By virtue of this 
affirmation, which is the essence of our soul, we recognize the 
eternal impossibility of nonbeing that can never be known or 
comprehended; and that ultimate question posed by the 
vertiginous intellect hovering at the abyss of the infinite: ‘Why is 
there something rather than nothing?, this question will be 
swept aside forever by the necessity of being, that is, by the 
absolute affirmation of being in knowledge (ibid., 155).  
 
For Tillich’s purposes, though not ultimately for Schelling, this 
dynamic being that incorporates and excludes nonbeing suffices to get 
the project of systematic theology underway. God is the affirmation of 
being, and if being is, as Spinoza realized, as power or the self-
expression of what is essential, the human finds her essential being 
expressed in the religious relationship. Another way to say this is to 
say that because the divine-human relationship is at the core of the 
human being, her fundamental problem (finitude) and her awareness 
of it (anxiety) all pertain to that relationship to too (CB 24-28). If 
modern man experiences life as precarious and his self-awareness is 
anxiety, anxiety is a religious experience.  
Tillich chooses to follow Schelling in calling the primordial or 
ontological aspect of God “the Abyss.” It is the ground of reality, 
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human and natural; it is ineffable or inconceivable, self-enclosed and 
manifests itself only as power of resisting nonbeing. The only thing 
literal or nonsymbolic that one can say of God is that it is being itself, 
neither a being nor the totality of being. Various theologies have tried 
to apply categories of relation to the God-human relationship, but it is 
symbolic or non-literal speech if we speak of God as the creator or 
immanent cause, or find that things inhere in God (ST1, 236-38). All 
ontological speech is symbolic or analogous—except to say that 
something is and cannot not be. Ever careful with his words, Tillich 
notes that “it is as atheistic to affirm the existence of God as to deny 
it. God is being itself, not a being” (ibid., 237). About symbolic speech, 
he thinks a symbol speaks ‘truly’ if it reveals something or speaks to 
somebody. But the history of religions is filled with dead symbols, or 
ways of speaking of the finite-infinite relation that fail to reflect light in 
both directions.  
 
Tillich adopts a mode of trinitarian thinking from Schelling that 
is ontological, prior to any discussion of Christian doctrine of the 
Trinity. Human intuition has always distinguished the element of power 
in the divine from the element of meaning, the logos or word, and 
then gone on to distinguish a third principle of communication or 
expression whereby the finite and the infinite are united, spirit (ST 1, 
250-251). Schelling displays this trinitarian way of thinking as early as 
the Bruno, where the three potencies of identity theory are rescued 
from the dry Spinozism of Presentation of My System and put into 
Neoplatonic and mythic guise, wherein the finite individuals in their 
apostasy from their organic life in the Ideas are seem to be products 
of self-will or self-temporization (SW 4: 283-84). The identity of all or 
the eternal potency is compared to the Father, the infinite or ideal 
potencies to the Spirit which unifies, while the finite is by its own will 
made subject to time and suffering (ibid., 252). Trinitarian thinking is 
found in the Philosophical Investigations as well, with one of the triadic 
structures (nature, man, and a personal God) used to secure the 
philosophical account of the possibility of evil (PI 62-63) and another 
(Ungrund, nature and spirit) used to explain the dynamics of 
development (ibid., 69-70).  
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III.  
 
Let us turn to a closer look at Tillich’s theology. Generally we 
will look to the text of Systematic Theology for discussions of 
theological and philosophical method. The contemporary look back at 
the interface of religious and other cultural institutions cannot help but 
be historical---and critical. For insight into Tillich’s thought about the 
current state of Christian theology and the possibility of its relevance 
to the human situation in the age of anxiety, when much of Christian 
writings, rites and morality are seen to be worn out and lacking in the 
power to guide, we look to the more homiletic Courage to Be lectures. 
Systematic theology operates by what Tillich calls the “the 
method of correlation.” Questions that are philosophical, or really 
anthropological, receive theological answers, for religion functions as 
one of the chief repositories of answers about existence that the 
question-posing animal requires. “Man is the question he asks about 
himself, before any question has been formulated” (ST I, 62). The 
method of correlation explains the content of the Christian faith 
through the interdependence of existential questions and theological 
answers (ibid., 60-61}. A coherentist epistemology is at work here. No 
inherently true human experiences, miraculous sightings or inerrant 
writings can be found to validate or invalidate a religious worldview—
something that is essentially philosophical (or undecidable)! 
“Revelation does not destroy reason, but reason raises the question of 
revelation” (ibid., 81).  
 
The Schelling of the 1809 Philosophical Investigations shares 
with both his major 20th century disciples, Heidegger and Tillich, the 
conviction that questions about God and world occur in humankind 
because man is the site of both questioning and self-awareness. 
Whether or not such questions are answerable, or resolvable through 
analysis or action, questioning is the human activity par excellence. 
Tillich remains optimistic about the availability of answers: “Man is 
able to answer the ontological question himself because he 
experiences directly and immediate the structure of being and its 
elements” (ST I, 169). As embodied finite reason, the human 
experiences being as limited power, existence as self-contradictory, 
and the life process itself as ambiguous (ibid., 81). But as subject or 
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self-aware, the human directly experiences being, existence and life 
and so has a pre-reflective experience of those dimensions of the 
divine that Christian revelation speaks of as the ground of being, the 
possibility of new existence, and the life of Spirit. When the abysmal 
ground manifests the logos, existence is seen to be not essentially 
guilt but ‘new being’, and the social and historical dimension of life, 
with all of its promise and frailty, is seen to bear the seeds of 
‘unambiguous life’ (See ST II, 176-77; III, 401-402, 420-422).  
 
In its first appearance, says Tillich, the ontological question 
considers the one who poses the question: self and world are 
presumed, tied together in subject-object structure. Secondly, the 
question concern the “elements” that make up the structure of being, 
thirdly the difference between essential being and existence, and 
fourth, the categories of being and knowing (ST I, 164). It is the 
second category that offers the richest field for comment, the vaguely 
named ontological elements, which come in three pairs:  
 
Individuality – Universality 
Dynamics – Form 
Freedom – Destiny 
 
All three concern human agency and its environment. The first 
pair considers the individual or person as the unit of human reality. 
Though singular in number, by possessing mind, the singular human is 
connected to others physically and temporally remote. ‘Communion’ or 
community is participation in one or more similarly individuated and 
self-centered selves, and is essential to the life of the individual (ibid., 
176). Quantification across this dimension yields an important 
measure of how persons experience themselves and their world, 
individualism vis-à-vis collectivism. Courage to Be uses this measure 
to distinguish not only political styles of existence, e.g., liberalism vis-
à-vis totalitarianism, but to contrast styles of Christian conscience, 
e.g., Protestant individualism and Catholic or medieval quasi-
collectivism (CB 101-117). Tillich avoids the stereotypical contrast 
between Protestantism’s freedom of conscience and Catholic 
authoritarianism, for factors other than religion and individual choice 
lessen the contrast between individualism and collectivism. 
Participating in economic production, for example, enforces a quotidian 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Futures of Schelling: The Second Conference of the North American Schelling Society, (2013). Unpublished paper. This 
article is © Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy and permission has been granted for this version to 
appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy does not grant permission 
for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Society for 
Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. 
10 
 
conformism in ‘free’ societies which makes daily life similar to that in 
centrally planned economies. The second pair is somewhat oddly 
named, for ‘dynamics’ indicates that which is unformed, but endowed 
with potential, or something relatively irrational in contrast to precise 
rationality. The tension between dynamics and form indicates a 
creative way of simultaneously conserving and transcending oneself, 
or of preserving oneself while transforming self and environing 
conditions—like the equilibrium of a physical system or the 
homeostasis of an organism (ST I, 174-76). Finally, the tension 
between freedom and destiny indicate the nature of a situated act by a 
free agent, one that necessarily takes place in a physical context and 
in a definite matrix of possibilities. “Freedom is experienced as 
deliberation, decision, and responsibility” (ibid., 184). That my act is 
situated means that destiny informs my freedom; that I have to weigh 
values and choose among competing alternatives means that my 
freedom participates in shaping my destiny.  
 
These three vaguely named structures of being together state 
the parameters of human existence that an individual person enacts—
social, biological and mental conditions of finite human freedom. While 
they give Tillich the tools for much of the critical or destructive work of 
Systematic Theology-- which is an encyclopedic review of the major 
epistemological, scientific, philosophical, political, psychological, social 
and religious ideas of our civilization-- they also give him the 
categories for positively elaborating the Christian ethic that is found in 
the Courage to Be lectures.  
 
The ontological situation for the post-modern human is 
continuous anxiety, accompanied by a pervasive guilt. Anxiety is 
object-less fear, fear that persists when fear is the only thing to fear. 
Guilt is the appropriate response. In earlier times, Western man 
required pictures and stories of places of punishment and torture by 
fantastic beasts and malevolent beings. Now the most ordinary human 
beings in the most secure places imagine themselves objects of 
surveillance; everyman is Kafka’s Joseph K.—or Edward Snowden. The 
human response is courage, ontological rather than soldierly courage, 
and the various styles of human existence—individualism, conformism, 
and collectivism—determine corresponding styles of courage to be. 
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Anxiety is an ontological malady, the awareness of our own 
finitude or of the fact that we carry nonbeing in our very ontic self-
expression. There is anxiety in every fear, and vice versa. The fear of 
death lurks behind the fear in every anxiety, but close inspection 
reveals that the human is anxious about being itself. “The basic 
anxiety, the anxiety of a finite being about the threat of nonbeing, 
cannot be eliminated. It belongs to being itself” (CB 39). Tillich 
elaborates three styles or potencies of anxiety: 1) the anxiety of 
unpredictability (fate) and death, 2) the anxiety of emptiness and 
meaninglessness, and 3) and the anxiety of despair. Uncertainty and 
lack of control prefigure death, the poverty of the outcome of one’s 
work portends meaninglessness, but the upshot of all our acts, from 
their moral foundations to their spiritual satisfaction, seems to crumble 
into dust and leave only a vague residue of guilt. Everything in human 
life points to despair, except for the multitude of petty distractions and 
evasions which for the most part keep us comfortably numb (ibid., 40-
56).  
 
In response to this map of the labyrinth of despair, Tillich offers 
a slim thread twisted from the various of courageous response. The 
basic alternatives are to rely upon oneself or to take refuge in the 
collective: self-reliance undergirds the romantic, naturalistic, and 
demonic forms of individualism seen in recent cultural history, and 
paves the way for the lonely encounter of the resolute person in 
absolute anxiety (ibid., 148-49). The other, collectivistic, alternative 
chooses the path of participation and becomes mysticism. The mystic 
is willing to turn ontology inside out and so finds rest in that doubt is 
turned against finite being and negates it, since everything that 
appears is deceptive and illusory. “Nonbeing is no threat because finite 
being is, in the last analysis, nonbeing. . . . The anxiety of 
meaninglessness is conquered where the ultimate meaning is not 
something definite but the abyss of every definite meaning” (ibid., 
158-59). Tillich has limited confidence in the mystic solution, although 
every individualistic kind of ontological courage involves an element of 
trusting in the abyss, or the power of being to overcome nonbeing.  
 
Since religion gives answers to questions that philosophy poses, 
it must be the elemental character of the human situation in which the 
definitive answer to anxiety can be found. So Tillich looks again to the 
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individual-or-participant structure of the person’s selfhood and finds 
that in the middle between mystic absorption into the ground and 
personal encounter with a so-called ‘divine person’ one finds faith (CB 
156-57). Absolute faith—perhaps naked faith might be the better 
term—does not deny or transcend meaninglessness as mysticism does, 
but embraces it, at least within a skeptical moment of its action. The 
skeptical element cuts against the subject-object structure of personal 
encounter, so that, it seems that the modern existentialist hero 
encounters nothing but meaninglessness in its purest or grittiest form 
(ibid., 177-78). It almost goes without saying that the skeptical 
element, so exercised, will also sweep away almost all the forms, 
formulas, and rituals of prior versions of Christianity. Though Tillich 
speaks more reticently (or professionally) in Systematic Theology, 
there is little asserted in its third volume about the Spirit, the 
community and the ‘kingdom of God’ in history that is edifying or 
consoling. The presence of the Spirit in a spiritual community that may 
or may not have much to do with the churches and their muddled 
histories is everywhere ambiguous, even if Spirit is defined as 
‘unambiguous life’ (ST 3, 183 ff). As representing the kingdom of God 
and embodying the spiritual community, the churches both reveal and 
hide (ibid., 375).  
 
Absolute faith is empty faith, or to say the same thing, 
ontological faith—trusting in the power of being--which always has to 
be glossed as the expansion or assertion of being over the contraction 
of nonbeing. Nonbeing is the element in being which forces, which by 
enclosing its power within limits, forces it to be beyond itself and to 
open itself as power and love. Speaking in almost as oracular as 
fashion as Schelling does in the Philosophical Investigations, Tillich 
states:  
 
Nonbeing (that in God which makes his self-affirmation 
dynamic) opens up the divine self-seclusion and reveals him as 
power and love. Nonbeing makes God a living God. Without the 
No he has to overcome in himself and in his creatures, the 
divine Yes to himself would be lifeless. There would be no 
revelation of the ground of being, there would be no life (CB 
180).  
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What of the ‘believer’ (or absolute skeptic, rather) in the 
situation of absolute faith? The horizon of meaningless is not 
expunged, guilt is not assuaged, and there is no Kantian court of 
reason to indict or to acquit. One finds, like the anguished Luther, that 
one is accepted trotz one’s unacceptability. At the boundary between 
being and nonbeing, and far beyond all forms of theism which ever 
and again forget the ontological difference and that figure the divine as 
a being, absolute faith fears no judgment and asks no forgiveness 
(ibid., 189-90). This is the paradox of Christianity, says Tillich: not 
irrational, not absurd, and nor reflectively or dialectically rational. The 
‘paradox’ is a new reality and not a logical riddle (ST II, 91).  
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